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Abstract. The simultaneous multiple-round auction (SMRA) and the combinatorial clock auction
(CCA) are the two primarymechanisms used to sell bandwidth. Under truthful bidding, the SMRA
is known to output a Walrasian equilibrium that maximizes social welfare provided the bidder
valuation functions satisfy the gross substitutes property [20]. Recently, it was shown that the com-
binatorial clock auction (CCA) provides good welfare guarantees for general classes of valuation
functions [7]. This motivates the question of whether similar welfare guarantees hold for the SMRA
in the case of general valuation functions.
We show the answer is no. But we prove that good welfare guarantees still arise if the degree of
complementarities in the bidder valuations are bounded. In particular, if bidder valuations func-
tions are α-near-submodular then, under truthful bidding, the SMRA has a welfare ratio (the worst
case ratio between the social welfare of the optimal allocation and the auction allocation) of at most
(1 + α). The special case of submodular valuations, namely α = 1, was studied in [12] and pro-
duces individually rational solutions. However, for α > 1, this is a bicriteria guarantee, to obtain
good welfare under truthful bidding requires relaxing individual rationality. In particular, it neces-
sitates a factor α loss in the degree of individual rationality provided by the auction. We prove this
bicriteria guarantee is asymptotically (almost) tight.
Truthful bidding, though, is not reasonable assumption in the SMRA [10]. But, bicriteria guarantees
continue to hold for natural bidding strategies that are locally optimal. Specifically, the welfare ratio
is then at most (1 + α2) and the individual rationality guarantee is again at most α, for α-near
submodular valuation functions. These bicriteria guarantees are also (almost) tight.
Finally, we examine what strategies are required to ensure individual rationality in the SMRA with
general valuation functions. First, we provide a weak characterization, namely secure bidding, for
individual rationality. We then show that if the bidders use a profit-maximizing secure bidding
strategy the welfare ratio is at most 1+α. Consequently, by bidding securely, it is possible to obtain
the same welfare guarantees as truthful bidding without the loss of individual rationality. Unfor-
tunately, we explain why secure bidding may be incompatible with the auxiliary bidding activity
rules that are typically added to the SMRA to reduce gaming.
Keywords: ascending auctions, SMRA, welfare guarantee, individual rationality, near-submodular.
1 Introduction
The question of how best to allocate spectrum dates back over a century, and the case in
favour of selling bandwidth was first formalized in the academic literature as far back as 1959
by Ronald Coase [8]. Over the past twenty years there have been large number spectrum
auctions world-wide and, amongst these, the Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction (SMRA)
and the Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) have proved to be extremely successful.
Both of these multiple-item auctions are based upon the same underlying mechanism. At
time t, each item j has a price ptj . Given the current prices, each bidder i then selects her
preferred set Sti of items. The price of any item that has excess demand then rises in the next
time period and the process is repeated. There are important differences between the two
auctions however. The SMRA uses item bidding, that is, the auctioneer views the selection of
Sti as a collection of bids, one bid for every item of S
t
i . It also utilizes the concept of a standing
high bid [11]. Any item (with a positive price) has a provisional winner. That bidder will win the
item unless a higher bid is received in a later round. If such a bid is received then the standing
high bid is increased and a new provisional winner assigned (chosen at random in the case
of a tie). Item bidding and standing high bids lead to a major drawback, the exposure problem.
Namely, a large set may be desired but such a bid may result in being allocated only a smaller
undesirable subset. If the bidder valuation functions satisfy the gross-substitutes property
then this problem does not arise. Indeed, given truthful bidding, Milgrom [20] showed that
the SMRA will terminate in a Walrasian Equilibrium that maximizes social welfare; see also
[15,13] who studied a similar auction mechanism. The exposure problem is also absent when
the bidder valuation functions are submodular. In that case, Fu et al. [12] show that the final
allocation, whilst not necessarily a Walrasiam Equilibrium, does provide at least half of the
optimal social welfare.4 For these classes of valuation function, the SMRA is individual rational
in every time period. That is, if bidder i is provisionally allocated set S at round t then the
value of S to i is at least the price of S.
For broader classes of valuation function that permit complementarities, though, the ex-
posure problem does arise under the SMRA. This is a practical issue because in spectrum
auctions bidder valuation functions typically do exhibit complementarities. The CCA [22]
was designed to deal with such complementarities. Specifically, the CCA uses package bidding
rather than item bidding. A package bid is an all-or-nothing bid. Consequently, a bidder can-
not be allocated a subset of her bid; in particular, a bidder cannot be allocated an undesirable
subset. Unfortunately, the basic CCA mechanism cannot provide for non-trivial approximate
welfare guarantees, even for auctions with additive valuation functions and a small number
of bidders and items [7]. It is perhaps surprising, then, that a minor adjustment to the CCA
mechanism leads to good welfare guarantees for any class of valuation function. Specifically,
if bid increments are made proportional to excess demand the welfare of the CCA is within
an O(k2 · log n log2m) factor of the optimal welfare [7]. Here n is the number of items,m is the
number of bidders and k is the maximum cardinality of a set desired by the bidders. The fact
that the CCA can generate high welfare for general valuation functions motivates the work in
this paper. Is it possible that the SMRA also performs well with general valuation functions?
1.1 Our Results
The short answer to the question posed above is NO, the SMRA cannot guarantee high social
welfare for valuation functions that exhibit complementarities (see Section 2.2).
It turns out however that we can quantify precisely the welfare guarantee in terms of the
magnitude of the complementarities exhibited by the valuation function. To explain this we
require a few definitions. Each bidder i ∈ B has value vi(S) for any set of items S ⊆ Ω.
The valuation function vi() is monotonically non-decreasing (free-disposal). Each bidder has
a quasi-linear utility, that is, its utility for a set S is vi(S) − p(S), where p(S) is the price of
S. The social welfare of an allocation S = {S1, . . . , Sn}, where the Si are pairwise-disjoint
subsets of the items, is ω(S) =
∑
i vi(Si). Next, to quantify the extent of complementarities,
4 Their proof is not for the SMRA, but it can be adapted to apply there.
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let the degree of submodularity [1] of a function f be
D(f) = min
x∈I
min
A,B:A⊂B
f(A ∪ x)− f(A)
f(B ∪ x)− f(B)
Note that f is submodular if and only ifD(f) ≥ 1. We say that f is α near-submodular ifD(f) ≥
1
α
. A similar concept to near-submodularity, called bounded complementarity, is introduced by
Lehman et al. [17].
The parameter α turns out to be key in explaining the performance of the SMRA. To ex-
plain this we require one more concept. We say that a bidder i ∈ B is λ-individually rational
if λ · vi(S
t
i ) ≥ p(S
t
i ) in each round t. Note that if λ = 1 then we have individual rationality.
We say that an auction mechanism is λ-individually rational if every bidder is λ-individually
rational. We then prove in Section 3:
Theorem 1. If bidders have α near-submodular valuations then, under (conditional) truthful bid-
ding 5,
(i) The SMRA outputs an allocation S with ω(S) ≥ 1
1+α
· ω(S∗) where S∗ is the optimal allocation.
(ii) The auction is α-individually rational.
The bi-criteria guarantees in Theorem 1 are (almost) tight. There are examples with α near-
submodular valuations where the SMRA is only α-individually rational and the welfare guar-
antee tends to 1
1+α
; see Section 3.3. Despite the fact that SMRA has arbitrarily poor welfare
guarantees, it seems to perform very well in practice. Theorem 1 provides an explanation for
this, and confirms empirical results, since complementarities exist but are typically bounded
in magnitude in most spectrum auctions. Indeed, the SMRA has been proposed for auctions
where valuation functions have weak complementarities [3].
There are, however, two major drawbacks inherent in Theorem 1. The first drawback is
that it relies upon truthful bidding, that is, in each round the bidder selects the feasible set
that maximizes utility. But, as we explain in Section 2.1, there are many reasons why a bidder
will not bid truthfully in the SMRA. One of these reasons is that, in a spectrum auction, a
bidder may not even know its own valuation function [10]. Bidders typically can however
make comparisons between similar sets. Thus, a natural method by which a bidder can select
a bid is via local improvement.
We show, in Section 4, that local improvement leads to similar guarantees as truthful bid-
ding (albeit with an additional α factor in the denominator for the welfare guarantee).
Theorem 2. If bidders have α near-submodular valuations then, under (conditional) local improve-
ment bidding,
(i) The SMRA outputs an allocation S with ω(S) ≥ 1
1+α2
· ω(S∗) where S∗ is the optimal allocation.
(ii) The auction is α-individually rational.
Again, the bounds in Theorem 2 are (almost) tight.
The second drawback is that Theorem 1 shows that the SMRA is not individually rational.
That is, it may produce outcomes which give negative utility to some bidders. Consequently,
in Section 5 we provide a detailed study of what bidding strategies are required to ensure the
individual rationality of the SMRA, and what are the consequences for welfare when such
strategies are used. Towards this end, we characterize the individual rationality of the SMRA
5 A detailed discussion on truthful and conditional truthful biddings will follow in Section 2.1.
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in terms of secure bidding. We then prove, in Section 5.2, that secure bidding has a goodwelfare
guarantees, provided the bidders make profit maximizing secure bids.
Theorem 3. If bidders have α near-submodular valuations then, under (conditional) profit maximiz-
ing secure bidding, the SMRA outputs an allocation S with ω(S) ≥ 1
1+α
· ω(S∗) where S∗ is the
optimal allocation.
Consequently, by bidding securely, it is possible to obtain the same welfare guarantees as
truthful bidding without the loss of individual rationality!
2 The Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction
The SMRA was first proposed by Milgrom, Wilson and McAfee for the 1994 FCC spectrum
auction. It is an ascending price auction that simultaneously sells many items. Let B be a set
of n bidders and let Ω be a collection of m items. For each item j ∈ Ω the auction posits an
item-price ptj at the start of round t. Moreover, the SMRA has a unique standing high bidder for
each item with a positive price. Specifically, at the start of round t, bidder i is the standing
high bidder for a set of items Sti ; we call S
t
i the provisional (winning) set for bidder i.
The SMRA mechanism: Initially p0j = 0 for each item j ∈ Ω, and S
0
i = ∅ for each bidder i ∈ B
and t = 0. The auction then iterates over rounds as follows. In round t, bidder i bids for a set
T ti ⊆ Ω \ S
t
i under the assumption that the price of each item j ∈ Ω \ S
t
i is incremented to
ptj+ǫ. We call T
t
i the conditional bid for i. The term conditional is used as the auctionmechanism
automatically assumes that bidder i also makes a bid of price ptj for every item j ∈ S
t
i (recall,
bidder i is the provisional winner of the items Sti ).
The item-prices and provisional sets are then updated. Take an item j and suppose that j
is in exactly k of the conditional bids. If k = 0 then no bidder has placed a bid on item j at the
incremented price ptj+ǫ. Thus we set p
t+1
j = p
t
j and the standing high bidder for j remains the
same, i.e. if j ∈ Sti then j ∈ S
t+1
i . On the other hand if k > 0 (we say that j is in excess demand)
then at least one bidder accepted the incremented price ptj + ǫ. Thus we set p
t+1
j = p
t
j + ǫ. The
mechanism then randomly selects a bidder i amongst these k bidders and places j ∈ St+1i .
Note that, in this case, the standing high bidder must change as the previous standing high
bidder was only assumed to bid the non-increment price ptj .
The mechanism then proceeds to the next round. The auction terminates when the con-
ditional bids T ti of all the bidders are empty, at which point each bidder i is permanently
allocated her provisional set Sti for a price
∑
j∈St
i
pti.
An extremely important property of the SMRA is that the use of standing high bidders
implies that every item with a positive price is sold.
Observation 4 In an SMRA auction, every item with a positive price is sold. ⊓⊔
2.1 Truthful Bidding in the SMRA
A key factor in determining the practical success of the auction is accurate price discovery
(see, for example Cramton [9,10]). This, in turn, relies upon bidding that is truthful or, at least,
approximately truthful. There are two pertinent issues here. Firstly, is the SMRA mechanism
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compatible with truthful bidding? Specifically, the use of conditional bidding implicitly im-
plies that bidders are forced to rebid on their provisional sets. However, suppose that T ti is
the optimal conditional bid, that is
T ti = argmaxT⊆Ω\St
i

vi(T ∪ Sti)− vi(Sti )−∑
j∈T
(ptj + ǫ)


It need not be the case that the implicit bid Sti ∪ T
t
i is truthful. In particular, we may have
Sti ∪ T
t
i 6= argmaxT⊆Ω

vi(T )− ∑
j∈T∩St
i
ptj −
∑
j∈T\St
i
(ptj + ǫ)


Recall, here, that bidder i has a personalized set of prices:
(
(p)St
i
, (p+ ǫ · 1)Ω\St
i
)
. Indeed, at
round t, bidder i has an ǫ discount on the prices of Sti .
Interestingly, truthful bidding is compatible with the SMRA (for any price trajectories)
precisely if the valuation function satisfies the gross substitutes property [20]. The gross sub-
stitutes property6 was defined by Kelso and Crawford [15] and used by them to prove the ex-
istence of Walrasian equilibrium. Moreover, with gross substitutes, the SMRA will converge
to a Walrasian equilibrium; furthermore such an equilibrium will maximize social welfare
(given negligible price increments) – see Milgrom [20,21].
Secondly, even if truthful bidding is compatible with the SMRA, it is unlikely that the
bidders will actually bid truthfully. For example, in bandwidth auctions, firms typically have
ranked bandwidth targets and budget constraints that aremore important than profit-maximization.
Moreover, the valuation function is often not known in advance, rather it is “learned" as the
auction proceeds. Regardless, the SMRA and the CCA do both incorporate a set of bidding
activity rules to encourage truthful bidding. In the CCA these include revealed preference
bidding rules that are difficult to game [4,6]. However, the bidding rules in the SMRA are
weaker and strategic bidding is common – examples include demand reduction, parking,
and hold-up strategies [10].
Consequently, as well as examining truthful (optimal conditional) bidding, we will exam-
ine the natural strategy of local improvement bidding that consists of attempting to add one
item, delete one item, or replace one item in the current proposed solution. Gul and Stacchetti
[13] prove that this local improvement method finds an optimal demand set, given any set of
prices, if the valuation function has the gross substitutes property. We examine the quality of
outcomes, for more general valuation functions, when this local search method is used in the
SMRA in Section 4.
From now on, we concentrate on conditional bidding. Thus we will omit the term con-
ditional when we refer to conditional truthful bidding or conditional profit maximizing bid-
ding.
2.2 A Bad Example
Unfortunately, the welfare ratio of the SMRA can be arbitrarily bad if the valuations exhibit
complementarities. This is the case even for auctions with just two bidders {1, 2} and two
6 A valuation function satisfies the gross substitutes property if, given any set of prices, increasing the price of some
goods does not decrease demand for another good.
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items {a, b}. Suppose both bidders have value 1 for each individual, but value the pair of
items at M , for some large value M . Clearly, the optimal allocation has welfare M and con-
sists in allocating both items to one of the bidders. However, the allocation of the SMRA has
welfare 2 with probability 1
2
. Indeed, the provisional set at round t + 1 is the complement of
the provisional set at round t since the conditional bid of each bidder will be the complement
of her provisional set. So the final allocation (which occurs when both prices exceed M
2
) just
depends on the allocation at the end of the first round; this allocates one item to each bid-
der with probability 1
2
since it is randomized. By further increasing the number of identical
bidders, it can be shown that the probability of the low welfare outcome tends to one.
This simple example has an important implication. Note that, at any round, both bidders
bid on both items until the end of the auction. Thus, excess demand is constant in each round.
So, even if price increments depend on the excess demand, one cannot achieve a better welfare
ratio . This contrasts sharply with the behavior of the CCA whose welfare ratio becomes
polylogarithmic if the price increment is allowed to depend upon the excess demand and the
size of the demand sets are bounded [7].
3 Bicriteria Guarantees for the SMRA under Truthful Bidding
We now prove Theorem 1 and show that, under truthful bidding, the worst case welfare and
rationality guarantees are dependent upon the degree of submodularity in the bidder valu-
ation functions. First, in Section 3.1 we prove the individual rationality guarantee. Then, in
Section 3.2 we prove the welfare guarantee. Finally, in Section 3.3 we show that these guaran-
tees are (almost) tight.
3.1 A Rationality Guarantee
Theorem 5. Given α-near-submodular truthful bidders, the SMRA outputs an α-individually ratio-
nal allocation.
Proof. In order to show α-individual rationality upon termination, let us prove a stronger
result. Specifically, we will show that for any time t and any bidder i, every set S′ ⊆ Sti
satisfies α · vi(S
′) ≥ p(S′). We proceed by induction on t. The statement trivially holds for
t = 0. For the induction hypothesis, assume that bidder i is allocated the set Sti in round t
where
α · vi(S
′) ≥ pt(S′) ∀S′ ⊆ Sti (1)
We now require the following claim:
Claim. Let X ⊆ Sti ∪ T
t
i be such that α · vi(X) ≥ p
t(X ∩ Sti) + p
t+1(X \ Sti ). Then, for every
x ∈ T ti \X, we have
α · vi(X ∪ x) ≥ p
t(X ∩ Sti ) + p
t+1(X ∪ x \ Sti)
Proof. Take any x ∈ T ti \X. By α near-submodularity, we have
vi(X ∪ x)− vi(X)
vi(S
t
i ∪ T
t
i )− vi(S
t
i ∪ T
t
i \ x)
≥
1
α
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Consequently,
α · vi(X ∪ x)− α · vi(X) ≥ vi(S
t
i ∪ T
t
i )− vi(S
t
i ∪ T
t
i \ x)
≥ pt+1(x) (2)
= pt(x) + ǫ
Here the second inequality follows from truthful bidding. Otherwise, T ti \ x is a more prof-
itable bid than T ti . The equality arises as x /∈ Si.
By the condition in the statement of the claim, we have α·vi(X) ≥ p
t(X∩Sti )+p
t+1(X\Sti ).
Therefore
α · vi(X ∪ x) ≥ p
t(X ∩ Sti ) + p
t+1(X \ Sti ) + p
t+1(x)
= pt(X ∩ Sti ) + p
t+1(X ∪ x \ Sti )
Again, the equality arises as x /∈ Si.
By iteratively applying the previous claim over items in a set Xˆ ⊆ T ti \X, we obtain
Claim. Let X ⊆ Sti be such that α · vi(X) ≥ p
t(X). Then, for every Xˆ ⊆ T ti \ X, we have
α · vi(X ∪ Xˆ) ≥ p
t(X ∩ Sti ) + p
t+1(X ∪ Xˆ \ Sti ). ⊓⊔
Now take any Sˆ ⊆ St+1i . To complete the proof of Theorem5, wemust show that α·vi(Sˆ) ≥
pt+1(Sˆ). For this purpose, set S′ = Sˆ ∩Sti and set T
′ = Sˆ \Sti . By the induction hypothesis, we
have that α · vi(S
′) ≥ pt(S′).
Thus we may apply the second claim with X = S′ and Xˆ = T ′ to obtain
α · vi(Sˆ) = α · vi(S
′ ∪ T ′)
≥ pt(S′ ∩ Sti ) + p
t+1((S′ ∪ T ′) \ Sti )
= pt(S′) + pt+1(T ′)
Furthermore, note that S′ ⊆ Sti ∩ S
t+1
i . In order to be the provisional winner of an item j
in both rounds t and t+ 1, it must be the case that no other bidder bid for item j at the price
pt+1(j). Thus the price of j at time t+ 1 remains pt(j). Hence pt+1(S′) = pt(S′), and so
α · vi(Sˆ) ≥ p
t(S′) + pt+1(T ′)
= pt+1(S′) + pt+1(T ′)
= pt+1(Sˆ)
Theorem 5 follows by induction. ⊓⊔
We remark that this proof implies a stronger conclusion: if bidder i is truthful then she is
α-individually rational regardless of the strategies of other bidders.
3.2 A Welfare Guarantee
Theorem 6. Given α-near-submodular truthful bidders, the SMRA outputs an allocation S = (S1, . . . , Sn)
with social welfare ω(S) ≥ 1
1+α
·ω(S∗i )where S
∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n) is an allocation of maximumwelfare.
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Proof. Assume the auction terminates in round t with a set of prices pt. Thus T ti = ∅ for each
bidder i. In particular, by truthfulness, we have that
vi(Si ∪ (S
∗
i \ Si))− p
t(S∗i \ Si) ≤ vi(Si ∪ ∅)− p
t(∅) = vi(Si)
Thus
vi(S
∗
i ) ≤ vi(Si ∪ S
∗
i ) ≤ vi(Si) + p
t(S∗i \ Si)
We now obtain a (1 + α) factor welfare guarantee.
∑
vi(S
∗
i ) ≤
n∑
i=1
(
vi(Si) + p
t(S∗i \ Si)
)
≤
n∑
i=1
vi(Si) +
n∑
i=1
pt(S∗i )
≤
n∑
i=1
vi(Si) +
n∑
i=1
pt(Si)
≤
n∑
i=1
vi(Si) +
n∑
i=1
α · vi(Si)
= (1 + α) ·
n∑
i=1
vi(Si)
Here the third inequality follows because the SMRAmechanism utilizes provisional winners.
This implies that every item with a positive price is sold at the end of the auction. Conse-
quently,
∑n
i=1 p
t(Si) ≥
∑n
i=1 p
t(S∗i ). The fourth inequality follows as the auction allocation is
α-individual rational, as shown in Theorem 5. ⊓⊔
By combining Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 we obtain Theorem 1.
3.3 Tightness of the Bicriteria Guarantees
The bounds in Theorem 1 are almost tight. To see this, consider the following example. There
are k items X = {x1, x2, . . . , xk}. Let there be a large number L of identical bidders. For any
S ⊂ X, each bidder i has a valuation:
vi(S) =
{
1 if |S| = 1
(|S| − 1) · α+ 1 if |S| ≥ 2
It is easy to verify that this function is α near-submodular.
The optimal welfare is obtained by allocating the entire setX to a single bidder achieving
social welfare (k − 1) · α + 1. Now let us examine the allocation produced by the SMRA.
Initially, all prices are 0 and the truthful bid for each bidder is to demand the entire set X.
Indeed, every bidder keeps bidding on the entire set (except for the items that she is the
standing high bidder) until every item has price greater than 1
k
((k − 1) · α+ 1). At this point,
no profitable bids can be made and all bidders drop out.
In each round, the randomly chosen standing high bidders are all distinct with probability
at least (1− k−1
L−1)
k. For L >> k, this probability tends to 1. So by the end of the auction, the k
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items are allocated to k different bidders with probability almost 1. Since the social welfare of
this allocation is only k, the expected social welfare of the SMRA is around k. When k goes to
infinity, the welfare ratio tends to α.
Next consider the rationality of this allocation. Each winner was allocated exactly one item
with probability almost 1, and the final price of that item is 1
k
((k − 1) · α+ 1). The bidder has
only value 1 for the item. When k goes to infinity, this tends to α-rationality for the winners.
We remark that even for k = 2 items, the previous example ensures that the welfare guarantee
cannot be improved beyond α
2
since the optimal welfare is (α + 1) and the expected welfare
of the SMRA is 2.
4 Bicriteria Guarantees under Locally Optimal Bidding
As discussed in Section 2.1, the assumption of truthful bidding is unrealistic in the SMRA.
Consequently, here we examine an alternate natural bidding method. Given St−1i , a bid T
t
i ⊆
Ω \St−1i is locally optimal if vi(S
t−1
i ∪ T
t
i )− p
t(T ti ) ≥ vi(S
t−1
i ∪X)− p
t(X) for allX ⊆ Ω \St−1i ,
where |X \ T ti | ≤ 1 and |T
t
i \X| ≤ 1. Observe that a locally optimal bid can be obtained via
a local improvement algorithm that, given the current solution, seeks to add one item, delete
one item, or replace one item. Analysing this local improvement method is useful because
local comparison is a key tool used by bidders in real bandwidth auctions. Thus, there are
practical reasons to suspect that bidders will notmake bids that are clearly not locally optimal.
From the theoretical viewpoint, this specific local improvement method is interesting because
it is guaranteed, given any set of prices, to output an optimal set if the valuations satisfy the
gross substitute property [13].
Now if we assume that bidders bid on locally optimal sets, we can still obtain bicriteria
guarantees on both the welfare and the rationality of the mechanism.
Theorem 2. If bidders have α-near-submodular valuations and make locally optimal bids, then the
SMRA has welfare ratio 1
1+α2
and is α-individually rational.
Proof. We first argue that the allocation of the SMRA is α-individually rational.
Lemma 1. If bidders have α-near-submodular valuations and make locally optimal bids, then the
SMRA has welfare ratio 1
1+α2
and is α-individually rational.
Proof. The proof is the same as that of Theorem 5. Truthfulness was used to prove Inequality
2 in Claim 3.1. Observe, however, that truthfulness is not necessary; locally optimality is suf-
ficient to prove Inequality 2 since we just need that the utility of Ti is better than the utility of
any subset T ′ of Ti such that |Ti \ T
′| = 1. Moreover no condition on valuation functions is
used in Claim 3.1. ⊓⊔
Next, we show that the social welfare of the SMRA is at least 1
1+α2
of the optimal welfare.
Lemma 2. If bidders have α-near-submodular valuations and make locally optimal bids the SMRA
outputs an allocation S = (S1, . . . , Sn) with social welfare
n∑
i=1
vi(Si) ≥
1
1 + α2
·
n∑
i=1
vi(S
∗
i )
where S∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n) is an allocation of maximum welfare.
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Proof. Assume the auction terminates in round t with a set of prices pt. Thus T ti = ∅ for each
bidder i. Let S∗i \ Si = {x1, x2, . . . , xℓ}, say. By local optimality, we have, for any xj ∈ S
∗
i \ Si,
that
vi(Si ∪ xj)− p
t(xj) ≤ vi(Si ∪ ∅)− p
t(∅)
= vi(Si)
Thus
vi(Si ∪ xj)− vi(Si) ≤ p
t(xj) (3)
We then have
vi(S
∗
i ) ≤ vi(Si ∪ S
∗
i )
≤ vi(Si) +
ℓ∑
j=1
(vi(Si ∪ {x1, . . . , xj})− vi(Si ∪ {x1, . . . , xj−1}))
≤ vi(Si) + α ·
ℓ∑
j=1
(vi(Si ∪ xj)− vi(Si))
≤ vi(Si) + α ·
ℓ∑
j=1
pt(xj)
= vi(Si) + α · p
t(S∗i \ Si)
Here the third inequality follows by α near-submodularity. The fourth inequality comes from
Inequality (3). We finally obtain a (1 + α2) factor welfare guarantee:
∑
vi(S
∗
i ) ≤
n∑
i=1
(
vi(Si) + α · p
t(S∗i \ Si)
)
≤
n∑
i=1
vi(Si) + α ·
n∑
i=1
pt(S∗i )
≤
n∑
i=1
vi(Si) + α ·
n∑
i=1
pt(Si)
≤
n∑
i=1
vi(Si) + α ·
n∑
i=1
α · vi(Si)
= (1 + α2) ·
n∑
i=1
vi(Si)
Here the third inequality follows because the SMRAmechanism utilizes provisional winners.
This implies that every item with a positive price is sold at the end of the auction. Conse-
quently,
∑n
i=1 p
t(Si) ≥
∑n
i=1 p
t(S∗i ). The fourth inequality follows as the auction allocation is
α-individual rational, as shown in Lemma 1. ⊓⊔
By combining Lemmas 1 and 2, we obtain our theorem.
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4.1 Tightness of Bicriteria Guarantees
The bounds in Theorem 2 are essentially tight. To see this, consider the following example.
There are k · n + 1 items. Specifically, there is a special item z and, for each i ∈ [n], there is a
collection of k itemsXi = {xi,1, xi,2, . . . , xi,k}.
There will be two classes of bidders. First, there are n Type I bidders. Bidder i ∈ [n] only
values the itemsXi = {xi,1, xi,2, . . . , xi,k}. For any S ⊆ Xi, she has a valuation:
vi(S) =
{
α if |S| = 1
(|S| − 1) · α2 + α if |S| ≥ 2
Her marginal value is always zero for any item not inXi. This function is α near-submodular.
There are k ·n ·L Type II bidders, where L >> k, n. For each i ∈ [n] and each j ∈ [k], there
are L identical bidders that only value the set {xi,j , z}. Each such bidder ℓ has a valuation
function with vℓ(xi,j) = 1, vℓ(z) = H and vℓ({xi,j, z}) = H + α, where H is an integer larger
than α that we will specify later. Moreover, her marginal value is always zero for any other
item. Again, these valuation functions are α near-submodular.
Together, we have (k ·L+1) ·n bidders. The optimal welfare is obtained by allocating each
set Xi to the Type I bidder i and z to any Type II bidder. This allocation has social welfare(
(k − 1) · α2 + α)
)
· n+H .
Now consider the allocation produced by the SMRA. Initially at p = 0, the unique locally
optimal bid is for each bidder to bid every item in their demand set. Thus a Type I bidder
demands Xi and a Type II bidder demands {xi,j , z}. This bidding behavior will remain until
every item has price greater than α (Type II bidders still bid since H > α). Let us call this
round time t.
After time t, the locally optimal bid for each Type I bidder i is to demand the empty set. To
see this, note that pt(xi,j) > vi(xi,j) = α for each item in xi,j ∈ Xi. Each Type I bidder drops
out.
On the other hand, since L >> k, n, we may assume that the randomly chosen standing
high bidder for every item in each round is Type II (this happens with probability almost 1). In
particular, at time t, the standing high bidder for each item in Xi is Type II. After time t, Type
II bidders only bid on item z until its price reaches H . As a result, by the end of the SMRA,
every item is allocated to some Type II bidder. The total welfare of the SMRA auction is then
at most (kn − 1) · 1 + (H + α). For n >> H and sufficiently large k this gives a welfare ratio
that tends to α2.
Next consider the rationality of this allocation. Amongst the “winners", each Type II bid-
der (except at most one) wins exactly one item. The final price of that item in someXi is α but
the bidder has a valuation for the item of one. Thus, all these bidders are only α-individually
rational.
5 Individually Rational Bidding
So, as shown in Theorems 5 and 2, truthful and locally-optimal bidding can only ensure
approximate individual rationality in the SMRA. Consequently, such bidding strategies are
highly risky. In this section, we investigate what bidding strategies are risk-free and what are
the welfare implications of such strategies.
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We call a risk-free strategy conservative, and show in Section 5.1 that conservative bidding
is (weakly) characterized by secure bidding. Specifically, secure bidding always produces in-
dividually rational outcomes. Conversely, if the other bidders use secure bids then the only
way a bidder can ensure an individually rational solution is by also bidding securely. This
result holds even with stronger assumptions on the bidding strategies of the other bidders,
for example, that they make profit-maximizing secure bids.
We then examine the welfare consequences of secure bidding. Our main result, in Sec-
tion 5.2, is that then the welfare ratio is at most 1 + α provided the bidders make profit maxi-
mizing secure bids. This result is surprising in that we are able tomatch the welfare guarantee
of truthful bidding without having to lose individual rationality.
5.1 Secure Bidding
We say that a bidding strategy is conservative if it cannot lead to a bidder having negative util-
ity. Thus, conservative strategies are individually rational. To understand what strategies are
conservative, we first need to understand what constitutes a bidding strategy. In the SMRA,
a bidder can select a bid based upon the auction history she observed, for example, the se-
quence of price vectors, her sequence of conditional bids, and on her sequence of provisional
sets of items. Thus, we consider a bidding strategy to be a function of these three factors.7
We say that a conditional bid T ti is secure for bidder i (given the provisional winning set
Sti ) if vi(S
′) ≥ p(S′) for every S′ ⊆ Sti ∪ T
t
i . A bidding strategy is secure if every conditional
bid it makes is secure. It is easy to verify that any secure bidding strategy is individually ra-
tional. We now show that bidding securely in every round is essentially the only individually
rational strategy.
Lemma 3. Let t be an integer and T tˆi , S
tˆ
i , p
tˆ be the conditional bid of bidder i, the provisional winning
set of bidder i and the price vector at round tˆ for any tˆ ≤ t. If bidder i makes a non-secure bid in round
t+ 1, then there exist secure bidders who can bid consistent with the history and ensure that bidder i
has negative utility in the final allocation.
Proof. Assume that the conditional bid T t+1i of bidder i at some round t is not secure, then
there exists S′ ⊆ St+1i ∪ T
t+1
i such that S
′ satisfies vi(S
′) < pt+1i (S
′). Let us prove that there
exists an auction such that, with high probability, (i) the set allocated to i is S′, (ii) at any time
tˆ ≤ t, the provisional winning set of i is S tˆi and (iii) the price vector at round tˆ is p
tˆ.
The auction is as follows: there are many copies of the same bidder 1 whose valuation
function is v1. LetM be an integer larger than the maximum of the prices at any round tˆ ≤ t
and the maximum valuation of any subset of items for bidder i. The valuation function v1 of
all the copies of bidder 1 is additive8 and the value of each item is the following:
v1(s) =


M + 2 · ǫ if s ∈ Ω \ S′
pt(s) if s ∈ S′ \ Sti
pt(s)− ǫ if s ∈ S′ ∩ Sti
Claim. Assume that i bids on T tˆi at any round tˆ ≤ t. There is a sequence of secure bids such
that, for every tˆ ≤ t, with high probability
7 In some SMRA mechanisms, bidders also know the excess demand of each item.
8 A valuation function v is additive if v(S) =
∑
s∈S
v(s).
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(i) the price vector is exactly ptˆ at the end of round tˆ,
(ii) bidder i is the standing high bidder of the set S tˆ+1i .
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Proof. By induction on t, let us prove that if the copies of bidder 1 use the following strategy,
the conclusion holds. If the price of item s does not increase from round tˆ to round tˆ+ 1 then
no copy of bidder 1 bids on it at round tˆ; if the price of item s increases and s ∈ S tˆi then no
copy of bidder 1 bids on it at round tˆ; if the price of s increases and s /∈ S tˆi then all the copies
of bidder 1 bid on it at round tˆ.
By construction of the valuation function v1, at any time tˆ ≤ t, the value of any item
s ∈ Ω \ (S′ ∩ St+1i ) for copies of bidder 1 is at least its price. Moreover, if s ∈ S
t
i then copies of
bidders 1 do not bid on s at price pt(s) by construction. It is easy to verify that v1(s) is larger
than the price of s at any round where copies of 1 bid on it. As v1(·) is additive, all bids by
copies of bidder 1 up to round t are secure.
Let us show that items in excess demand are those whose prices increase between rounds
tˆ − 1 and tˆ. If the price of an item in Ω \ S tˆi is distinct in p
tˆ−1 and ptˆ, then all the copies of
bidder 1 bid on it, and it is in excess demand. Now assume s ∈ S tˆi , if the price of s increases,
then s ∈ S tˆi \S
tˆ−1
i (the provisional winner must change when there is a price increment). Thus
bidder i bids on s and then s is in excess demand.
Now let us show that with high probability, bidder i is the standing high bidder of the
items in S tˆi . Since the prices of any item s in S
tˆ−1
i ∩ S
tˆ
i do not increase, copies of bidder 1 do
not bid on s at round tˆ. Thus s is still in S tˆi . Moreover, bidder i is the unique bidder in excess
demand for the items in S tˆi \ S
tˆ−1
i . So the provisional set of bidder i contains S
tˆ
i . Let us prove
that it does not contain any other item swith high probability. First assume that s ∈ S tˆ−1i \S
tˆ
i .
Thus the price of s increases. And since i was the standing high bidders of these items at
round tˆ − 1, she cannot be the standing high bidder anymore at round tˆ. Assume now that i
bids on s /∈ S tˆ−1i ∪ S
tˆ
i . Then by construction, all the other copies of 1 also bid on s and then,
with high probability (since there are many copies of bidder 1), s is not allocated to bidder i,
which completes the proof of the claim. ⊓⊔
Now assume that at round t+1, bidder i decides to bid on T t+1i . Starting from round t+1,
copies of bidder 1 securely bid on subsets in the complement of S′ until the prices of all items
in Ω \S reachM +2ǫ. Note that since no copy of 1 bid on any item in S′, all the items in S′ are
in the provisional set of i at the end of round t+ 1. Copies of 1 continue to perform the same
bids until they drop out. On the other hand, bidder i can perform any bid.
Let us first show that the set allocated to i contains S′. At the end of round t+ 1, the price
of item s in S′ is pt(s) if s ∈ S′∩Sti and p
t(s)+ ǫ if s ∈ S′ \Sti . Thus the price of s is above v1(s)
and then copies of 1 cannot bid anymore on s since they make secure bids. Since S′ ⊆ St+1i ,
the set of items allocated to i by the SMRA contains the set S′.
Assume now that s /∈ S′ is allocated to i at the end of the procedure. Since copies of 1
continue to bid on it until its price is at least M + ǫ. This implies that bidder i bids on it at
price at leastM + ǫ. Thus the price of the set allocated to i is at leastM + ǫ, which is above the
value of any set for bidder i by definition of M . So i is not individually rational. Otherwise,
bidder i is allocated the set S′ and by definition of S′, we have pt(S′) > vi(S
′) and then bidder
i receives negative utility. ⊓⊔
9 Recall that i is the standing high bidder of S tˆi at the beginning of round tˆ, which explains the index difference.
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So, if the bids of the other bidders are secure, then performing a non-secure bid may lead
to negative utility. One may ask if a similar statement still holds if stronger assumptions are
made concerning the strategies of the other bidders. This is indeed the case. The following
lemma states that even if we know the other bidders are truthful (or if they make profit-
maximizing secure bids), making any non-secure bid is not individually rational. Bidder i
performs a profit-maximizing secure bid Ti if the bid is secure and the utility of Si ∪ Ti is maxi-
mized over all possible secure bids.
Lemma 4. Let t be an integer and T tˆi , S
tˆ
i , p
tˆ be the conditional bid of bidder i, the provisional winning
set of bidder i and the price vector at round tˆ for any tˆ ≤ t. Assume that there is an item of value 0 for
i with price ǫ · tˆ at any round tˆ ≤ t. If bidder i makes a non-secure bid in round t+ 1, then there exist
truthful (or profit-maximizing secure) bidders who can bid consistent with the history and ensure that
bidder i has negative utility in the final allocation.
Proof. Let us construct an auction such that at any round tˆ ≤ t, the price vector is ptˆ and the
provisional winning set of bidder i is S tˆi . Assume that at some round t, the bid of i is not
secure. Then there exists S′ ⊆ Sti ∪ T
t+1
i that satisfies vi(S
′) < p(S′).
Instance of the SMRA. Let us now construct an auction such that S′ is allocated to i. Let us
denote by s the item of value 0 for bidder i such that ptˆ(s) = ǫ·tˆ for any tˆ ≤ t. Before describing
formally the instance, let us give some intution. There are two main types of bidders. First we
create bidders for time periods tˆ ≤ t. For any item s′ whose price increases at round tˆ and
such that i does not bid on s′ at round tˆ, we create unit-demand bidders that bid on s in the
first tˆ − 1 rounds and bid on s′ at round tˆ. These bidders ensure that the price vector is ptˆ at
any round tˆ smaller than t. Second, we create bidder for time period tˆ > t. These bidders will
ensure that that the set allocated to i is S′. Indeed, they will bid on items in the complement
of S′ until we are sure that, if i still bids on them, the strategy of i is not conservative. The
most technical part of the proof consists in constructing the first type of bidders.
Let s′ be an item distinct from s such that ptˆ(s′) 6= ptˆ−1(s′). Assume moreover that s′ /∈ S tˆi .
Then we create three copies of a bidder b such that:
vb(S) =
{
ptˆ(s′) if S = {s′}
ǫ · tˆ if S = {s}
Moreover, we assume that if the utility of both items is the same, bidder b prefers item s′.
This preference rule can also be simulated by making a small modification to the valuation
function. However, we present it using the preferences rule, as we believe it makes the proof
cleaner. These three bidders are called the initial bidders of round tˆ for item s′. The initial bidders
are the union of the initial bidders of round tˆ for tˆ ≤ t. The initial bidders will permit to fit the
price vector at any round tˆ ≤ t.
Let M be the maximum of the value of a subset of items for bidder i and of ǫ · t. We can
now create the second type of bidder that will push the prices of items in Ω \ S′ after time
t. For each item s′ ∈ Ω \ S′, we create three copies of the same bidder such that the value of
s′ is 2(M + ǫ) and the value of s is M + ǫ. Such bidders are called the final bidders. The final
bidders will permit to ensure that the set S′ will be the set allocated to bidder i at the end of
the auction.
Let us prove the following simple facts:
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Claim. Let tˆ ≤ t. Assume that at round tˆ− 1 of the auction, the price vector is ptˆ−1 then:
– All the initial bidders of round tˆ′ < tˆ have an empty conditional bid at round tˆ.
– If the initial bidders of round tˆ′ > tˆ for item s′ bid on s′ at round tˆ then the price of s′ must
increase at any step between tˆ and tˆ′.
– All the final bidders bid on s at round tˆ.
– If s′ is an item such that ptˆ(s′) − ptˆ−1(s′) = ǫ and s′ /∈ S tˆi then there are initial bidders of
round tˆ bidding on s′.
Proof. Let b be an initial bidder of round tˆ′ for item s′ with tˆ′ < tˆ. The price of s at round tˆ is ǫtˆ
which is larger than the value of s for b which is ǫ · tˆ′. Moreover, since we have created initial
bidder of round tˆ′ for item s′, the price of s′ increases between rounds tˆ′ and tˆ′ + 1. And by
definition initial bidders, the value of s′ for b is ptˆ
′
(s′). Thus the price of s′ at time tˆ is larger
than the value of s′ for b. Since bmake secure bids, she does not bid on any item and then has
an empty conditional bid at round tˆ.
Let tˆ′ > tˆ and b be an initial bidder of round tˆ′ for item s′. At round tˆ, the utility of bidder b
for item s is ǫ · tˆ′− ǫ · tˆ = ǫ · (tˆ′− tˆ). And the utility of b for s′ is ptˆ
′
(s′)− ptˆ(s′). This difference is
ǫ times the number of rounds between tˆ and tˆ′ where the price of s′ increases. Thus it at most
ǫ · (tˆ′ − tˆ) and we have equality if and only if the price of s′ increases at any round between tˆ
and tˆ′. If the equality does not hold, then the utility of s is larger than the one of s′. Otherwise,
the preference rule ensures that s′ is prefered, which proves the second point.
The proof of the third point is straightforward. Assume that b is a final bidder for item s′.
By definition ofM , the utility of b on s is at leastM + 2ǫ since pt(s) ≤M . On the other hand,
the utility of s′ is at mostM + ǫ. Thus b bids on s′.
Let us finally prove the last point. According to the definition of the instance, we have
created three initial bidders of round tˆ for the item s′. Given ptˆ−1, these bidders have utility ǫ
for both s and s′ at round tˆ. By definition of the preference rule, if these bidders are allocated
the empty set, they prefer bidding in s′ rather than in s. Since they bid on at most two items s
and s′, one of these three bidders has an empty provisional set and then bid on s′ at round tˆ.
Running the auction. Let us prove by induction that, with positive probability, at any round
tˆ ≤ t, the price vector is ptˆ and the provisional set of bidder i is S tˆi . For t = 0 the statement
immediately holds. Now assume that the price vector of the auction fits ptˆ−1 after round tˆ− 1
and that i is the standing high bidder of the items in S tˆ−1i . For each item s
′ such that the price
of s′ increases between tˆ − 1 and tˆ and such that s′ /∈ S tˆi , we have created initial bidders for
s′ of round tˆ. Then the last point of the claim ensures that the price of s′ increases between
round tˆ− 1 and tˆ increases. Moreover, since these items are in excess demand and i does not
bid on them, bidder i is not the standing high bidders on these items are round tˆ.
Now consider any item s′ in S tˆ−1i that is still in S
tˆ
i . No initial bidder of round tˆwas created
for item s′. Moreover, all the initial bidders of round tˆ′ > tˆ for item s′ do not bid for s′ by the
second point of the claim. Indeed the price of s′ does not increase at any step between tˆ and
tˆ′. So there is no excess demand on s′ and then the price of s′ and its standing high bidder
remain the same. A similar argument ensures that no item x such that ptˆ
′−1(x) = ptˆ
′
(x) is in
excess demand. Thus the price of x is not modified.
Let us finally consider the items s′ in S tˆi ∩T
tˆ−1
i . Since the condition bid of i contains s
′, s′ is
in excess demand. Moreover, since i is a candidate to be the new provisional winner of such
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an item, s′ /∈ S tˆ−1i . However other bidders may also be candidates to be provisional winner
of s′ (for instance initial bidders for s′ of later rounds). Since the provisional winner is chosen
uniformly at random amongst the candidates, bidder i is chosen with positive probability.
So, for any round tˆ ≤ t, there is a positive probability that at any round tˆ ≤ t the price
vector is ptˆ and the provisional winning set of i is S tˆi . Now at round t + 1, bidder i bids on
T t+1i . The behavior of the auction after this round is different (and actually simpler). Indeed,
the claim ensures that no initial bidder makes any conditional bid anymore. Moreover
– Since the prices of items in S′ are larger than their values for any other bidders, no bidder
will bid on any item in S′ after round t. Thus the set of items allocated to i contains the set
S′.
– Since there exist a lot of bidders whose value on each item in Ω \ S′ is larger than the
value of any set for bidder i, these bidders will continue to bid on these items until bidder
i drops out. Thus no item of Ω \ S′ will be allocated to i at the end of the procedure.
It completes the proof of Lemma 4. ⊓⊔
5.2 Social Welfare under Secure Bidding
The previous results ensure that secure bidding strategies are essentially the only way to
guarantee 1-individual rationality. In this section, we will assume that bidders strategies are
secure. The following simple lemma ensures that any allocation where each bidder is allo-
cated at least one item can be obtained in the SMRA with bidders only making secure bids.
Lemma 5. Any allocation where each bidder is allocated at least one item can be obtained via the
SMRA with secure bidders. In particular if each bidder is allocated at least one item then the optimal
allocation can be obtained if bidders are secure.
Proof. Let S = (S1, . . . , Sn) be an allocation of the items where Si 6= ∅ is allocated to bidder i.
Then this allocation can be obtained with secure bidders. Indeed, assume that at round t = 0
each bidder simply bids on the set Si. Since all the items have price 0, all the bids are trivially
secure. Then, at the end of first step, every bidder i is the standing high bidder of the set Si
and no item is in excess demand. Thus the SMRA stops and allocates to each bidder i the set
Si. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5 is unsatisfactory in twoways. First, if there are bidders that are allocated nothing
then the situation can be far more complex. Specifically, it may then be the case, see Lemma 6,
that secure bidding cannot provide a guarantee on welfare.
Lemma 6. If super-additive bidders only make secure bids, then there is no guarantee on the social
welfare of the SMRA.
Proof. Let M be a positive integer. Consider an auction with three bidders {0, 1, 2} and two
items {a, b}. The bidders {0, 1} are unit-demand. The value of item a for bidder 0 is equal to
1 and the value of item b for bidder 1 is equal to 1. Bidder 2 has a super-additive valuation
function. Its value for each individual item is 1
2
but it has value M for the set {a, b}. Observe
that if bidder 2 bids securely, then she cannot bid on the items a or b once their prices rise
beyond 1
2
. Therefore thewelfare is only 1with item a allocated to bidder 0 and item b allocated
to bidder 1. Clearly, the optimal allocation has welfareM which can be arbitrarily large. ⊓⊔
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The second unsatisfactory aspect of Lemma 5 is that the structure of the bids used there
is extremely artificial, since the bidders need to know all the valuation functions in order to
calculate the secure bids. Theorem 3 shows we can circumvent both of these problems if the
bidders’ valuation functions are α-near-submodular. Then a good welfare guarantee can be
obtained if the bidders make profit-maximizing secure bids.
Theorem 3. Given bidder valuation functions that are α near-submodular. Assume moreover that all
the set values are multiple of ǫ. If each bidder bids for a profit-maximizing (conditional) secure set in
every round then the SMRA outputs a solution S with welfare ω(S) ≥ 1
1+α
· ω(S∗).
Proof. Let S∗ = {S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n} be the optimal allocation, and let S = {S1, . . . , Sn} be the as-
signment output by the SMRA. By assumption, Si is the most profitable secure set in the
final round, and the conditional bid Ti is empty in the final round and then Si was the
provisional set for bidder i in the penultimate round. Let S∗i \ Si = {x1, x2, . . . , xk} and let
Xj = {x1, x2, . . . , xj}, for each j ≤ k.
For every item xj ∈ Si, since the conditional bid Ti is empty, there are two possibilities.
– Case 1: {xj} is a secure conditional set but not as profitable as ∅. Then vi
(
Si ∪ {xj}
)
−
p(xj)− ǫ < vi(Si). LetQij be Si, and we have p(xj) ≥ vi
(
Qij ∪{xj}
)
− vi(Qij) since values
are multiple of ǫ.
– Case 2: {xj} is an insecure conditional set. Then there exist a set Q ⊆ Si such that vi
(
Q ∪
{xj}
)
< p
(
Q ∪ {xj}
)
. On the other hand, since Si is a secure set, vi
(
Q
)
≥ p
(
Q
)
. Let Qij be
Q, and we have p(xj) ≥ vi
(
Qij ∪ {xj}
)
− vi(Qij).
In both case, we have p(xj) ≥ vi
(
Qij ∪{xj}
)
−vi(Qij). Using these inequalities, we can bound
vi(S
∗
i ).
vi(S
∗
i ) ≤ vi(Si ∪X
k)
= vi(Si) +
k∑
j=1
(
vi(Si ∪X
j)− vi(Si ∪X
j−1)
)
≤ vi(Si) +
k∑
j=1
α ·
(
vi
(
Qij ∪ {xj}
)
− vi(Qij)
)
≤ vi(Si) + α ·
k∑
j=1
p(xj)
≤ vi(Si) + α · p(S
∗
i )
The second inequality is becauseQij ⊆ Si and vi(·) is α-near-submodular. The third inequality
is derived from the case analysis above.
Finally, we are ready to bound the welfare ratio.
∑
vi(S
∗
i ) ≤
n∑
i=1
vi(Si) + α ·
n∑
i=1
p(S∗i )
≤
n∑
i=1
vi(Si) + α ·
n∑
i=1
p(Si)
≤ (1 + α) ·
n∑
i=1
vi(Si)
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The last inequality holds because under secure bidding, the allocation is individually rational.
⊓⊔
The bound in Theorem 3 is almost tight. This can be seen by adapting the example in
Section 3.3.
Thus, under secure bidding we are able tomatch the welfare guarantee of truthful bidding
without having to lose individual rationality. This suggests that secure bidding might be the
best strategy to use in an SMRA auction. Unfortunately, this is probably not the case. Recall,
from Section 2.1, that in addition to the basic ascending price mechanism the SMRA has an
associated set of bidding activity rules to encourage truthful bidding. As discussed, the rules
are actually too weak to ensure truthful bidding. But the rules are strong enough to make
secure bidding very risky. In particular, each bidder has an amount of eligibility points. The
larger the number of points the bigger the collection of items a bidder may bid on. A bidder
loses eligibility points if she bids on a small set – such bids will then hurt the bidder in later
rounds. Observe that secure bidding naturally favours bidding upon small sets and is, thus,
risky.
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